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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 14 DECEMBER, 1960 NUMBF 1
STUDIES IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
FOREWORD
The hazards of planning a symposium in the field of jurisprudence
derive largely from the fact that the field is itself ill-defined; the
legitimate "province of jurisprudence," to use Austin's phrase, has
never been fully agreed upon. A historical approach seemed reason-
ably satisfactory, however, and what follows is a series of studies of
some of the great figures in the history of legal philosophy. Happily,
no one of our contributors was satisfied with simple exegesis or even
with appraising matters of purely historical importance. Each study
is an attempt to deal critically with a facet of its subject which is of
contemporary significance.
The introductory essay by Roscoe Pound, "The Function of Legal
Philosophy," was originally printed forty years ago. During that
time it has remained unsurpassed as a concise statement of the
functional significance of twenty-four hundred years of legal specu-
lation. The collection of articles which follows Dean Pound's in-
troduction is obviously not intended as a comprehensive survey of
that vast philosophical heritage. In reviewing some of the basic
issues with which that heritage has been concerned, however, this
symposium does touch most of the great ages of legal philosophy.
The Greek period is represented by Hans Kelsen's detailed analysis
of Plato which takes sharp issue with recent contentions that Plato
was a proponent of an empirically grounded natural law. The
central figure in the medieval period was Thomas Aquinas, and
Thomas E. Davitt, S.J., explores the contemporary implications of
the Thomistic theory of law in the fields of Constitutional Law,
Torts, Criminal Law and Property.
In terms of traceable influence on the lives of men, the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries produced some of the most important
figures in the entire history of legal philosophy. From an examination
of four eighteenth-century theories of justice (those of Hume, Rous-
seau, Montesquieu and Kant), Clarence Morris draws some inferences
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about the modern legislative machine and the responsibilities it
places upon the judicial process. John Austin's theory of law is
considered by Samuel E. Stumpf, and his conclusions question the
common belief that Austin's system was premised on a complete sep-
aration of law and morals. In a unique study of the arresting
Nietzsche, Thomas A. Cowan finds support for a jurisprudence of a
truly experimental and critical sort.
Modern European legal philosophy has produced many distinctive
contributions and only a few of them could be treated here. Jhering's
attempt to revise the fundamental notion of law itself is examined
by Iredell Jenkins, who offers an explanation for the widely diverse
interpretations put upon Jhering's work by his contemporary follow-
ers. The impact of the Nazi regime on legal thought continues to be
an important area for analysis, and Wolfgang Friedmann's account
of Radbruch's legal philosophy could not avoid involvement with
this issue. Although the roots of the Pure Theory of Law are
European, it remains the only contemporary legal philosophy en-
joying truly world-wide influence. Reginald Parker tersely and clearly
summarizes its basic tenets.
Justice Holmes was more than just another legal theorist. In avoid-
ing systematic concern with the problems of technical philosophy
while at the same time deeply probing the materials of his profession
for what must certainly be called philosophical insight, he typified
much of twentieth-century American legal philosophy. In an en-
gaging and poetic study, John C. H. Wu describes the resulting
parallel between the philosophy of Holmes and the very spirit of
the common law process. If Holmes was one of the more philosophi-
cally oriented of American jurists, Morris Cohen was the most
juristically oriented of American philosophers. Huntington Cairns
surveys the complex and wide-ranging world of Morris Cohen and
notes particularly Cohen's insistent queries into the meaning of
scientific method. Some genuinely fresh material in the literature of
jurisprudence is provided by Andrew Reck in detailing the meta-
physical system of the provocative yet virtually unknown Elijah
Jordan. Jay W. Murphy has covered the entire breadth of John
Dewey's philosophy in an attempt to isolate Dewey's theory of
justice. The extensive annotation of this essay adds to the literature
a much needed bibliography on Dewey and the law. It has been more
than thirty years since, in Hessel E. Yntema's words, the "placid
current of juristic speculation in the United States was stirred by the
advent of legal realism." From a first-hand acquaintance with the
forces and men behind this movement, Professor Yntema examines
both the strengths and weaknesses which have been its issue.
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The reader who has examined the articles mentioned so far will
not need to be reminded of the quantity of legal philosophy's un-
finished business. But it seemed appropriate to conclude the volume
with a direct thrust into the future. In raising questions about the
construction of language systems appropriate to communications
about justice, Julius Stone and G. Tarello chart some of the new
ground which must be explored by legal philosophy in the second
half of our century. The concluding study thus gives force to the
point made in Dean Pound's introductory essay-that today, legal
philosophy must once again "build rather than merely improve" to
the end that the law which we hand down to tomorrow's jurist "will
achieve justice in his time and place."
Wmnim R. ANDERSEN
Faculty Editor

